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COMMENTS
WHY SEEING IS NO LONGER BELIEVING:
MISAPPROPRIATIONS OF IMAGE AND SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION
The science fiction film Contact,' released in the summer of 1997,
featured something "alien" to other films-a cameo role by the current
President of the United States.2 President Bill Clinton "appears" as a mem-
ber of the cast in three scenes, commenting on the film's fictional plot devel-
opments.3
To create the appearance of the President's participation in the film,
numerous real-life clips of President Clinton were used.4 Recent advances in
digital technology make such visual effects possible, giving filmmakers the
ability to use unwilling participants in films and make them appear to say
things they never said.5 As evidenced in Contact, this technology also al-
lows filmmakers to use sound bites in an entirely different context from
which the words were originally uttered.
Contact, an imaginative fictional adventure, depicts scientist Ellie Ar-
roway's search for meaning within the universe. 6 The film delves into the
familiar topic of whether life exists outside the planet Earth.7 In particular,
the film explores the philosophical and theological aspects of the discovery
of life on a distant star.' The film also embraces other themes including me-
1. CONTACT (Time Warner Entertainment 1997).
2. See Andy Seiler, Technology Puts Fiction in 'Contact' with Reality, USA Today, July 30,
1997, at 5D, available in 1997 WL 7009294.
3. See Mark Caro, Acting President Whether He Knows It Or Not, Clinton Has a Role in
Contact, Cm. TRIB., July 14, 1997, at 1; see also discussion infra Part IIA (describing how the
film was made).
4. See Seiler, supra note 2. The use of actual news footage implies President Clinton's
authorization of its use.
5. Id. Contact producer Steve Starkey remarked that new technology makes it possible to
make anyone say anything. Id.
6. See CONTACT, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Dave Jewett, Make Contact with Smart, ThoughOful Sci-F Drama, COLUMBIAN, July 10,
1997, available in 1997 WL 10811587.
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dia invasiveness and the power struggle between the military and scientists
with respect to extra-terrestrial exploration. 9
Although fictional, Contact's premise concerning the existence of ex-
tra-terrestrial life is theoretically plausible.'0 In addition, the film's use of
cameos of real-life Cable New Network ("CNN") reporters" and appear-
ances by President Clinton all contribute to a film where "seeing is no longer
believing." President Clinton's "role" in Contact, while adding considerable
entertainment value to the film, is highly troubling.
Blurring the line between reality and fiction in entertainment,' 2 Presi-
dent Clinton's presence contributes to the veracity of the film. His role in
the film would not be cause for concern had he been a willing member of the
cast or had endorsed the use of his image. However, neither President Clin-
ton nor the White House was aware of his role in the film until a week be-
fore the film's scheduled release date. 13 If the President does not authorize
such uses, it is possible that society will be unable to distinguish whether the
U.S. is really involved in a crisis. This is true when society sees an image of
the President where it is not easy to distinguish a fictional use from reality.
Use of the President's image in a contrived situation sent over the Internet,
for example, where it appears as though the U.S. is in imminent danger is
alarming.
This Comment addresses the legal issues that arise by the unauthorized
use of a sitting president's image and speech. Although presidential
speeches are not protected under copyright law,' 4 there are other possible le-
gal claims that a president can assert.' This Comment discusses the claims
that a president could bring to prevent, or at least deter, the use of their im-
age and/or speeches in a misleading context. In addition, this Comment ar-
gues that there is inadequate legal protection against distorted imagery when
9. Id.
10. Id. "[S]o much of the science seems at least theoretically plausible." Id.
11. Marvin Kalb, Journalists Blur Their Roles, DENV. POST, July 27, 1997, at E02 (stating
that at least 13 CNN journalists and pseudo journalists, ranging from Bernard Shaw to the once
vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro, play themselves for long stretches in the film); see
also Fred Davis, When Reporters Blur Line Between Fact and Fiction, SEATTLE TiMES, July 25,
1997, at B5 (stating that the journalistic line is crossed when news people report on issues of fic-
tion in a film, no matter how realistic the story). But see Those Darn Space Aliens, COM. APPEAL,
July 19, 1997, at A6 (finding that after considerable criticism for unethical journalism, CNN has
decided that this will be the last film to feature real life news reporters from it's network).
12. Fred Davis, When Reporters Blur Line Between Fact and Fiction, SEATTLE TIMES, July
25, 1997, at B5.
13. Amy Dawes, Hollywood Abducts the President; Clinton's Image Inserted into Film,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 11, 1997, at N 1.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
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the distortion is not defamatory in nature. 16 Given the implications and dan-
gers of using a president's image and speeches for commercial purposes, the
current state of the law should be evaluated and modified to prevent repeated
and potentially dangerous misappropriations.
Part II of this Comment discusses the technology that made President
Clinton's presence in the film possible, and the White House response to the
film. Part III explores present day implications of the fading line between
journalism, fact, and fiction. In addition, this Part illustrates the possible
disastrous consequences of using techniques like those employed in Contact.
Part IV explains why Contact producers did not violate copyright laws.
Part V analyzes several current legal measures that could be used to prevent
presidential image misappropriations. Part VI sets forth solutions to curtail
the unauthorized use of a president's image. Finally, Part VII concludes
that, ultimately, the public will bear the harm from these types of misappro-
priations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Contact Was Made
President Clinton's appearance in Contact was made possible through
the use of digital imaging technology.' 7 Previous archival footage of press
conferences were spliced into the film.' 8 The first news conference in the
film, which makes the most extensive use of President Clinton's image actu-
ally combines footage from three separate real-life appearances by the
President. The film's first sound bite was President Clinton's actual re-
sponse to the real-life announcement scientists made regarding the recovery
16. See generally Robert W. Butler, Tacky Or Not, Not Even the Prez Can Stop the Digital
Parody Parade, KAN. CITY STAR, July 27, 1997, at J2.
17. See Lisa Byrne Anastasio Potter, Altered Realities: The Effect of Digital Imaging Tech-
nology on Libel and The Right of Privacy, Note, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 495, 498. The
image is captured after scanning a printed photograph, a videotape frame, or a television transmis-
sion into a computer. Id. The scanning device then breaks the image down into numerous geo-
graphic picture elements, known as pixels, assigning a number to each pixel. Id. Each pixel repre-
sents various attributes of the image, such as color, and the digital scanning device operator can
manipulate the pixels in a variety of ways: "colors can be changed, brightness or shadow added,
elements of the picture removed entirely, or elements from other images added." ld. The ma-
nipulated image now has many potential uses: "it can be stored in the computer for later use,
transmitted to another computer, or fixed on paper or a video screen." Id. Tampering of the im-
ages are "virtually undetectable." Id. at 499.
18. Mick La Salle, Reluctant Movie Star/White House Objects to Clinton Footage in
'Contact', S.F. CHRON., July 12, 1997, at Al.
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of a meteorite that contained evidence of possible microbial life on Mars.1 9
President Clinton's remark-"[i]f this finding is confirmed, it will give us
stunning insight into the nature of the universe and humanity"20 -could not
have fit more perfectly in the script if director Robert Zemeckis wrote it
himself. In other scenes, sound bites from President Clinton's comments re-
garding the Oklahoma City bombing were similarly digitally lifted and
spliced into the film's entirely different context and setting.
21
One technically complicated aspect in creating the first news confer-
ence scene was that it was scripted to take place inside the White House. 2
However, President Clinton's actual comments about the real-life meteorite
were made outside in the Rose Garden. Accordingly, the film's visual ef-
fects made it appear as though the President was speaking from the Oval Of-
fice. Additional technical problems for the filmmakers stemmed from the
fact that the first scene was a composite of three separate appearances by
the President wearing three different suits.23 Film engineering was again
used to "dress" the President in a single suit. 24
In a later scene, the President is depicted in a conference with fictional
government officials and scientists.2 5 Actual footage of the scientists came
from videotaped Cabinet meetings. Through digital insertion, actors re-
placed the actual advisors. 2' Another scene uses footage of the President
meeting with Japanese delegates at an Oval Office photo opportunity.
2 7
Once again, Contact producers were able to digitally insert actors in place
of the real-life delegates. 8
Although President Clinton's remarks in Contact were his actual
words, senior special effects supervisor, Ken Ralston, has made it clear that
he could have easily altered the President's statements.29 In Forrest Gump,3
another film directed by Zemeckis, voice doubles were used to mimic several
presidents, thus making it possible to have these "pseudo-actors" say any-
19. Id.
20. See Butler, supra note 16.
2 1. Id. In a scene where President Clinton is reacting to a sabotage, the following quote was
used: "I would warn everybody not to be influenced beyond the known facts. We are monitoring
what has actually happened." Id.
22. See Caro, supra note 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See CONTACT, supra note 1.
26. See Caro, supra note 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra note 52.
30. FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1995).
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thing.3 Contact producer Steve Starkey describes the process as inputting a
sampling of all the vowel and consonant sounds of a particular person's
voice into a computer.32 The computer then formulates a completely new
sentence and re-animates the face so that it fits with the words.33
In Forrest Gump, Zemeckis edited footage of past presidents through
the use of digital technology, to make it appear as if they were interacting
with actor Tom Hanks.34 Words were technologically put in the "mouths"
of the presidents. Although President Clinton's words were unaltered in
Contact,35 because his comments were taken out of context, this distinction
becomes irrelevant. The scenes create the appearance that the President
talking about the possibility of the existence of alien life when in fact he was
not. It is just as deceptive to imply that the President is talking about
something he is not than to digitally change his words.
Unlike Forrest Gump, Contact was made and released while President
Clinton was still in office. 36 While the unauthorized digital use of both dead
and living personalities has been a looming legal and moral issue in recent
years,37 the first time use of a sitting president adds increased volatility to
the issue.
38
B. White House Response
The White House was displeased when it discovered the manipulation
of President Clinton's image in Contact.39 Once alerted to the fact that the
President's image and words were misappropriated 4° in a film about to be
released, White House counsel Charles Ruff wrote Robert Zemeckis:
31. See Seiler, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Michael Ollove & Carl Cannon, Clinton's Splice of Life, BALT. SUN, July 11, 1997,
at 1E, available in 1997 WL 5519883.
35. Id. Warner officials admit that although President Clinton's statements in Contact were
authentic, he was not talking about aliens when he made them. Id.
36. See generally, Mike McDaniel & Ann Hodges, Clinton, CNN Object To Appearances in
Film, Hous. CHRON., July 15, 1997, at 1. McDaniel advises the makers of Contact to "stick with
dead presidents." Id.
37. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Public-
ity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 158 (1993); Barbara M. Lange, Note, Shopping for the Califor-
nia Right of Publicity, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 151, 153, 161 (1993).
38. See Dawes, supra note 13.
39. See La Salle, supra note 18.
40. Misappropriation is "[t]he unauthorized, improper, or unlawful use of funds or other
property for purpose other than that for which intended." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 998 (6th ed.
1990).
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You have manipulated images of the President's public state-
ments, taken them out of the context in which they were uttered
and adapted them to fit the plot of your film. By appropriating
President Clinton's image and words in this manner, you have es-
sentially given him a role in your film without authorization ....
We believe your use of the role you have created for President
Clinton in 'Contact' to promote and advertise the film is im-
proper.
Furthermore, commentators outside the White House have suggested
that using the President's image for commercial purposes is insulting to the
dignity of the office.42 While the film industry is aware that the White
House did not approve of using the President's image, 43 it is not likely to
cease such efforts in the future. To date, White House counsel took no fur-
ther legal action.
III. BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN FACT AND FICTION: SECURITY ISSUES
The use of President Clinton's image in a film implies consent.44 The
unauthorized use of the President's image in Contact is disturbing, mislead-
ing and deceptive. By incorporating his image into the film, the filmmakers
of Contact sought to make the film as realistic as possible.45 In doing so,
viewers of Contact might have been misled, believing that President Clinton
either authorized the use of his image and speech or directly participated in
the making of this film.
The American presidency has long been considered a hallmark of the
stability of our government.46 The power and credibility of the presidency
depends upon the prestige of the White House.47 Commercial use of the
presidential image degrades this prestige.48 In a democracy, it is important
for the presidency to be respected. Thus, as a social policy matter, a
41. See La Salle, supra note 18 (quoting White House counsel Charles Ruff).
42. See generally Bill Gershbein, Films Damage Prestige of Presidency, SUN-SENTINEL,
Aug. 3, 1997, at 4G.
43. See La Salle, supra note 18.
44. See Seeing is no Longer Believing; The Makers of "Contact" Used the President's Im-
age Without His Consent, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1997, at N2. This article asserts that
"[s]howing a lectern bearing the Great Seal of the United States implies the authority of office and
the official approval of the government for a specific cause." Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally Gershbein, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. See Gershbein, supra note 42.
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president should not willingly or even unwillingly endorse products or take
part in fictional films.49
In response to the White House letter, Zemeckis answered that "[tlhe
president works for us"5° and producer Steve Starkey further commented
that "[t]he speeches the President makes are in the public domain ... [w]e
didn't alter a word [President Clinton] said... [and only] digitally replaced
the setting. '"' This statement stresses the emphasis Zemeckis places on the
fact that he did not change the President's words. 2 However, this position
ignores the fact that by removing President Clinton from the context where
he made these remarks and putting him in a fictional film, Zemeckis has dis-
honestly created the impression that the President played a role in the film.
It is irrelevant whether the President's words were altered; a distortion was
created nonetheless.
As an outgrowth of the digital technology used in films like Forrest
Gump and Contact, the reality of the moving visual image is quickly erod-
ing." While it is true that there is little fear that the public would rely on a
fictional film for accurate information, the technology can be used to ma-
nipulate the media that people rely on for factual information. 4 Conse-
quently, there is a legitimate fear that people will soon fail to differentiate
between what is authentic and what is fiction.55
Not knowing if the sitting president is speaking of an actual event, or if
his image and voice are being manipulated is disturbing. Accurate informa-
tion is necessary for a well-functioning democracy. 6 The public has a fun-
damental need to rely on the media for accuracy. A film that manipulates
footage of the sitting president causes public mistrust of the media.
49. La Salle, supra note 18.
50. Movie Black Magic: CNN Learns That Hollywood Glamour Might Not Serve the Inter-
ests of Truth, INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 1997, at A6.
51. Dawes, supra note 13.
52. The senior special effects supervisor clearly acknowledges that he had the ability to
change the President's words. See Seiler, supra note 2. Zemeckis stated, "I did it in Forrest Gump
... it's a very easy thing to do." Id.; see generally, James Bennet, Lights! Camera! Executive
Action!, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 13, 1997, at F12.
53. See generally LaSalle, supra note 18. Zemeckis, in his own defense, stated "I do think it
is something people have to be aware of: Just because images are moving doesn't mean they are
truth." Id.
54. See generally Kalb, supra note 11.
55. See Dawes, supra note 13 (quoting Dr. Judith Grant, a professor of political science at the
University of Southern California).
56. Id.; see generally Jon Lawrence Dartley, Lost Horizons?: Tortious and Philosophical
Implications of Computer Imaging, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 199, 200 (1993).
19981
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It is not hard to imagine how the use of the presidential image and
voice could be deliberately misused for malevolent purposes. 57 The 1938
Orson Welles radio prank illustrates the potential for large numbers of peo-
ple to mistake what was intended only as a joke for the truth.58 As a Hal-
loween prank, Orson Welles broadcast a story using fictitious news reports
that Martians were invading the earth and spreading poisonous gas.59 The
story sent Americans into a state of panic and disarray.60 The following
broadcast was heard by over six million people:
Ladies and gentlemen, I have just been handed a message that
came in from Grover's Mill by telephone. Just a moment. At
least forty people, including six state troopers lie dead in a field
east of the village of Grover's Mill, their bodies burned and dis-
torted beyond all possible recognition .... Ladies and gentlemen,
I have a grave announcement to make. Incredible as it may seem,
both the observations of science and the evidence of our eyes lead
to the inescapable assumption that those strange beings who
landed in the Jersey farmlands tonight are the vanguard of an in-
vading army from planet Mars. The battle which took place to-
night at Grover's Mill has ended in one of the most startling de-
feats ever suffered by an army in modem times; seven thousand
men armed with rifles and machine guns pitted against a single
fighting machine of the invaders from Mars. One hundred and
twenty known survivors. The rest strewn over the battle area
from Grover's Mill to Plainsboro crushed and trampled to death
under the metal feet of the monster, or burned to cinders by its
heat ray.
61
Although the broadcast was announced as fictional at the outset, many
tuned in after this announcement was made and believed that the radio
broadcast was real.62 Mobs of terrified listeners filled the streets, jammed
telephone lines and sought refuge in crowded churches.61 In subsequent in-
terviews, people explained that they were confident that radio was a reliable
source of information and, therefore, believed the broadcast realistically
57. See generally id.
58. See generally HADLEY CANTRIL, THE INVASION FROM MARS: A STUDY IN THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PANIC 47-54, 70-71 (1940).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. HOWARD KOCH, THE PANIC BROADCAST: PORTRAIT OF AN EVENT 52-57 (1970).
62. Id.
63. CHARLES HIGHAM, ORSON WELLES, THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN GENIUS 123-
27 (1985).
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portrayed "scientists" and "officials" who urged immediate action. 64
Welles' use of familiar towns and highways increased both the broadcast's
legitimacy and listeners' alarm.65
It is easy to envision a situation similar to the Orson Welles incident
arising from the use of the a sitting president's image and speeches out of
context. In one frightening scenario, a commentator theorizes what would
occur if someone used President Clinton's image on a comedy channel to say
derogatory remarks about Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Russians might
view the broadcast and fail to see the joke.66
Aside from this potential for political and diplomatic crises, there is le-
gitimate concern that citizens will be confused. 67 While it is unlikely that a
large number of people viewing Contact would believe it to be a work of
non-fiction,68 it is highly probable that people would believe the President
either acted in or endorsed this film. It is also easy to envision how this
technology could be used in more serious situations which would actually
mislead or deceive the public.
Under the current state of the law regarding presidential speeches and
images it seems that such technological irresponsibility is unchecked. 69 The
current state of the law leaves the nation unprotected from mischievous
filmmakers whose intentions may be innocuous and those with more danger-
ous ends.
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW FAILS TO PREVENT USE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
SPEECH AND THE VIDEO CLIPS OF HIS IMAGE IN CONTACT
The exclusive right of authors to publish their work for a limited time
period is the cornerstone of copyright law. 70 Copyright protection extends to
speeches if they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 7' The Copy-
64. See CANTRIL, supra note 58, at 70-71.
65. Id. at 52.
66. Bennet, supra note 52 (interviewing Marvin Kalb, director of the Shorenstein Center on
the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University).
67. See generally Kinney Littlefield, News Stars Blur the Line: News or Show Biz?,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 18, 1997 (Show), at I (implying that a CBS news anchor's role in the
film Contact "might confuse average folks about the relationship of entertainment to news").
68. See discussion supra Part V.A.3. (discussing parody).
69. One commentator notes that "in less playful hands the use of the presidential image and
voice, deliberately misused for malicious purpose, could kick off a political or diplomatic crisis."
See Kalb, supra note 11.
70. Public Affairs Assoc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). This requirement is easily met if an author of a speech writes
down the work prior to its delivery. Id.
1998]
60 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
right Act of 1976 uses the phrase "original works of authorship," 72 instead
of limiting protection solely to written works. Such language broadens the
scope of protectable works outside the realm of a printed form.73 In passing
the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress made its intent clear:
it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of
fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds,
pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether em-
bodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic,
sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device 'now known or later developed.' 74
Thus, the value of original authorship remains unabridged whether the
work is presented in written, oral, or visual form. 75
A. Governmental Works Exception
Although Title 17 of the United States Code76 offers numerous copy-
right protections, there is one notable exception. Works produced for the
United States Government by its employees are generally not subject to
copyright protections. 77 A governmental work is defined as "a work pre-
pared by an office or employee of the Unites States Government as part of
that person's official duties., 78  Such publications include "the Presidents'
messages ...the Congressional Record, departmental pamphlets, maps,
regulations, and judicial decisions .... , 79 Notwithstanding this exception,
government employees are entitled to copyright protection for any works
they produce outside the scope of their employment duties. 0
72. Id.
73. The language of the current amended statute was broadened from the previous statute in
order to avoid inequitable distinctions. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996); White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (stating the medium in which the work was fixed de-
termined its copyrightability).
74. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
75. See Rickover, 284 F.2d at 273 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (stating that "[s]peeches ... are unique
among literary products.").
76. Title 17 constitutes federal copyright law. 17 U.S.C. (1996).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1996). "Copyright protection under this title is not available for any
work of the United States Government .... Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (stating that the
intended effect of section 105 is to place all works of the United States Government, published or
unpublished, in the public domain).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
79. Rickover, 284 F.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
80. See id. In Rickover, the work in question was afforded copyright protection despite the
Plaintiff's government employment. See also United States v. First Trust Co. of St. Paul, 251 F.2d
686 (8th Cir. 1958) (holding a private journal was found not to be kept in the course of a govern-
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President Clinton's remarks regarding a meteorite from Mars, or any
other official speeches he makes, are part of his presidential duties. Thus,
these speeches fall under the "uncopyrightable" governmental works provi-
sion of section 105 and enter the public domain, which gives "writings,
documents, or publications that are not protected by copyrights"" public
ownership status. The public domain represents works the public may freely
use without obtaining permission from the authors.82 Works in the public
domain include works categorically excluded from copyright protection and
works with expired copyright protection.83 The public domain is an essential
tool in a democracy where the people's knowledge and political influence
depend on broad discussion of governmental matters.8 4 It is in the public's
interest to have free access to public information.85
B. Video Footage of President Clinton Used in Contact
The video footage of President Clinton used in Contact, to the extent
that it constitutes an original work, is subject to copyright protection.1
6
While President Clinton's speeches used in Contact would not be afforded
copyright protection, it is likely that there is a copyright in the video footage.
As such, there are several plausible explanations for the use of the video
footage at issue.
The most obvious explanation is that the video footage used in Contact
may have been licensed or obtained from CNN. It is not likely that CNN
would bring suit against Contact producers because of common ownership.
Contact was produced by Warner Brothers which is a subsidiary of Time
Warner.87 Time Warner, in addition to owning Warner Brothers, also owns
CNN.
88
Even if the footage was not shot by CNN, but by another news organi-
zation or individual, the producers of Contact could have easily contracted
for a license to use the video footage in Contact. Alternatively, the video
footage may be considered a fair use. The fair use doctrine allows a third
ment employee's duties).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990).
82. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. CoPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA
137 (1993).
83. Id. at 151.
84. Rickover, 284 F.2d at 268 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
85. Samuels, supra note 82, at 182.
86. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990). In Feist, the
Supreme Court declared that originality, the constitutional requirement for constitutional protec-
tion, exists in independent creations that reflect a modest level of creativity. Id.
87. See Kalb, supra note 11.
88. See id.
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party to use to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
the consent of the copyright owner.89
Regardless of whether the video footage of President Clinton used in
Contact is protected by copyright law, it is certain that the speech is not. As
such, other avenues of protection against misuses of the President's speech
and image must be explored. 90
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED USES OF THE
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND IMAGE - THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY
In simplistic terms, the right of privacy is an individual's right to be
left alone. 9' Although privacy rights are not explicitly mentioned in the
United States Constitution, such rights have been found to arise from the
concept of personal liberty found in the Bill of Rights.92 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized two separate interests that may establish an
invasion of privacy claim.93 The first interest is an individual's right to
avoid disclosure of personal matters. 94 Second, individuals have a right to
autonomy in making various important decisions. 95
The history of litigation involving general invasion of privacy causes of
action has led to the classification of four distinct torts: intrusion, public
disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation. 96 The tort of ap-
propriation focuses on the proprietary interests of protecting against misap-
propriation of one's name or likeness for commercial value. 97 If a private
person's name or likeness is misappropriated to advertise a product, that
89. See HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Four
factors are evaluated to determine if a use is a "fair use." 17 U.S.C. §107 (1996). These factors
include the "purpose and character of the use," "the nature of the copyrighted work," "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," and " the
effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work." Id.
90. See infra Parts V.-VI.
91. Hon. John L. Breeden, Jr. & Douglas M. Zayicek, False Light Invasion of Privacy, a
New Tort in Town?, 9 S.C. LAW. 39 (1997); see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right toPrivacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
92. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.") (citations omitted).
93. Breeden, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (1965) (holding that an individual has
the right to use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman's right
to an abortion within certain time constraints).
96. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 4 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
97. Prosser, supra note 96, at 406.
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person may recover for such an invasion of private life under appropria-
tion.98
The right of publicity stems from the tort of appropriation. 99 Because
public figures cannot persuasively argue that their privacy is invaded when
their name and likeness is appropriated,' 0 the right of publicity emerged to
protect their commercial interests in the appropriation of their persona. 101
The purpose of the right of privacy is to prevent injury to feelings while the
right of publicity seeks to avoid commercial harm.10 2 This Comment sug-
gests that either the right of publicity or false light invasion of privacy are
applicable causes of action for the type of privacy invasion experienced by
the President in Contact.
A. Right of Publicity
A right of publicity claim arises when an individual's name or picture
has been appropriated by another for his own financial benefit.'0 3 This tort
recognizes an individual's right to own, protect, and profit from the com-
mercial value of their own name or likeness.1"4 In essence, the publicity
value that public figures have in their name, face and speech is a form of
property. 1
05
1. The Right of Publicity for Political Figures
Political figures, like entertainers, are public figures and are entitled to
the right of publicity as a property right. 0 6 Similar to entertainers, political
figures have usually invested considerable time, money and effort in estab-
lishing their public image. 10 7 Political figures have created publicity value in
their names and images by their own labors in a very competitive field.'0 8
98. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
99. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 Fd. 866, 868 (2nd Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
100. Eileen R. Rielly, The Right of Publicity of Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Prods., 46 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1985).
Those who actively cultivate a public image, including celebrities and other public figures cannot
claim a privacy right to be left alone. Id. at 1164-71.
101. Haelan, 202 Fd. at 868.
102. See Rielly, supra note 100, at 1164.
103. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-50 (1995).
104. ld.
105. See Rielly, supra note 100, at 1167.
106. Id. at 1163; see Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., 694 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding that a political figure has a right of publicity).
107. Rielly, supra note 100, at 1170.
108. See id.
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The right of publicity for a political figure was considered for the first
time in Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products. 09 In that case the plaintiffs sought an injunction to pre-
vent the defendant from marketing plastic busts of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. as funeral accessories."0 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit certified, inter alia, the following issues to the Supreme Court of
Georgia: 1) whether the right of publicity was distinct from the right of pri-
vacy, 2) whether the right of publicity survives the death of its owner and 3)
whether an owner must commercially exploit his right of publicity in order
for that right to survive him."'
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of publicity was dis-
tinct from the right of privacy, that this right continues after death and that
commercial exploitation is not necessary in order for this right to descend to
the decedent's heirs.1 2 The importance of the holding in King for the pur-
pose of this Comment lies in the determination that political figures are enti-
tled to a right of publicity.
2. The Right of Publicity in the Context of Films
In most states, the right of publicity only applies to uses of an image
associated with a commercial product." 3 Thus, use of an image in a film
often would fall outside the ambit of a right of publicity claim because it
would not be considered a commercial product. In these states, a film would
constitute an expressive work and, thus, be immune from right of publicity
liability because of the First Amendment protection afforded to expressive
works."14
Some states, however, have a broader right of publicity statute that
may provide a claim for use of an image in a film. Under New York's
"appropriation of privacy" statute," 5 for example, courts have distinguished
between non-fictional news and fictionalized entertainment." 6 Accordingly,
while "commercial damage [is] not actionable for use of identity in 'news',
[it is] ... actionable for use in 'entertainment,' even entertainment based on
'news. ,,,117
109. 694 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 675.
111. Id. at 674.
112. Id. at 683.
113. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
114. See J. THoMAs McCART-Y, THE RIGH-rs OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8.8 (1998).
115. Id. at § 8.9[C].
116. Id.
117. Id.
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If a film is not specifically excluded from a state's right of publicity
statute or under that state's common law, the next issue is whether the use of
personal identity in a fictional work gives rise to such a cause of action." 8
Perhaps, the only rationale for putting a real person into a fictitious story
that is unrelated to that person is for commercial benefit. 9 Using the iden-
tity of a real person attracts attention and enhances the value of what is es-
sentially a product: the fictional work. 2 ° This is similar to using a public
figure to attract attention to a tangible product, such as a computer or a
car.
12 1
This argument posits that the creative efforts of the author should de-
termine whether the work is deserving of First Amendment protection. A
use deserving First Amendment protection would be one where the media
portrayal provides pertinent information in the public's decision making
122process. However, if a "work merely capitalizes on the attributes of an-
other, without contributing anything substantially unique or new, [then it
should] be subject to liability.' ' 2  The latter type of work should not be af-
forded First Amendment protection because they do not add to the cultural
experience of the consumers of the work.' 24 Applying this argument to use
of President Clinton's speech and image in Contact, President Clinton
should be afforded a right of publicity cause of action because his presence
in Contact was not necessary and was unrelated to the plot; his purpose as a
character in the film is only to attract attention to the film.
3. A Right of Publicity Claim for President Clinton Based on the Use of His
Persona in Contact
In Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp.,25 the plaintiff sued for the
unauthorized use of his image in the film The Commitments on right of pub-
licity grounds. 126 In the film, actors viewed a twenty-seven second clip of
James Brown's appearance on a television show from 1965.127 The plaintiff
118. Id. at § 8.9[A].
119. Id. at § 8.9[B].
120. See McCARTHY, supra note 114, § 8.9[B].
121. Id.
122. ld.
123. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real Peo-
ple by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1604-05 (1979).
124. Id.
125. 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.C. Cir. 1992), aft'd, 15 F.3d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 168 (alleging violations of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, as well as other
common law causes of action).
127. Id.
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asserted that viewers would believe that he endorsed the film, thus violating
his right of publicity.128 The court held that using the clip of James Brown
did not violate Brown's publicity rights because there was little chance that
viewers would believe that he was endorsing the film. 2 9
The circumstances in Contact are distinguished from Brown because
President Clinton's image and speech were integrated into Contact. The
actors in Contact were not merely watching him on television, instead, the
President appeared as an actual cast member. The likelihood that viewers
would believe that President Clinton endorsed Contact is much higher than
the likelihood that viewers would believe that Brown endorsed The Com-
mitments.
In Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing, Inc., 3° Paul Marcinkus, a Vatican
official, sued the defendants on the grounds that they commercially exploited
his personality in a work of fiction. 3' This case involved a fictitious novel
where the plaintiff was depicted as one of the lead characters who assassi-
nated a Soviet official. 32 The issue in Marcinkus was whether a fictional
work that uses the actual name and office of the plaintiff would violate New
York's right of privacy statute which encompasses the right of publicity in
that state.'33 In finding that the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to sup-
port a cause of action the court stated, " . . . the placing of the plaintiffs
name in a prominent place and the quoting of statements from the book ut-
tered by the character with the plaintiff's name and office raises the question
to whether or not the defendants commercially appropriated his name.
'
,
1
1
4
If President Clinton were to posit a right of publicity claim he could le-
gitimately rely on the findings in Marcinkus. The appropriation of President
Clinton's persona in Contact is similar to the commercial appropriation that
occurred in Marcinkus because President Clinton's speech, image and name
128. Id. at 172.
129. Id. at 173.
130. 522 N.Y.S. 2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1010.
133. Id. at 1009. Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law holds that "a person, firm or
corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or
picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person is...
guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. CIv . RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1998). Section 50 is New
York's right of privacy statute which was held to encompass the right of publicity in Stephano v.
News Group Pubs., Inc. Stephano v. News Group Pubs., Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct.
1984).
134. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S. 2d at 1014. In Marcinkus, the plaintiffs requested an injunction
instead of damages. Id. The injunction was ultimately denied because of the great harm that the
publisher would have had to bear and because the publisher agreed not to use the plaintiff in any
further advertisements. Id. at 1014-15.
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were used in a prominent place throughout the film and were taken out of
context. In Marcinkus, the plaintiff argued that the incorporation of his
name and office was unnecessary to the plot and that the same novel was
published in a different region using a different name.'35 Likewise, in Con-
tact there is little rationale for using President Clinton rather than obtaining
an actor to play the president. Contact, unlike Forrest Gump, was not a
historically based film and there was no need to use the actual president.
13 6
In fact, in the novel on which Contact was based, the president was a
woman. 137 Thus, it appears that use of President Clinton's image in a film
that is unrelated to him constitutes a commercial use and should give rise to
a right of publicity claim.1
3 1
4. The "Newsworthy" Exception Does Not Apply to the Use of President
Clinton's Persona in Contact
Actions of political figures often fall under the umbrella of
"newsworthy.' ', 39 The First Amendment protects newsworthy information in
order to safeguard our nation's commitment to lively debate on political is-
sues. 14  These constitutional protections, however, are not unlimited.
Commercial misappropriation is not considered to be privileged by the First
Amendment. 41 First Amendment interests are minimal in cases of economic
misappropriation "because advertisers are not interested in making any
statement other than 'buy me.",' 42 Furthermore, commercial misappropria-
tions are denied constitutional protection because it is fraudulent to give the
public a false implication of a business relationship between a public figure
and some media fixture. 14  Because the makers of Contact committed this
type of fraud, the sound bites used in the film would not fall under the
newsworthy exception.
135. Id. at 1010.
136. Joseph J. Beard, Will The Reel, Er, Real Bill Clinton Please Stand Up, 15 ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. 3 (1998).
137. Id.
138. See MCCARTHY, supra note 114, at § 8.9[B].
139. See Rielly, supra note 100, at 1172.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1163; see generally Albert F. Smith & Lionel S. Sobel, The Mickey Mouse
Watch Goes to Washington: Would the Law Stop the Clock?, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 346
(1972). "We are dealing with nothing more than commercial interests and economic gain as the
purpose of and motive for the appropriation, and it should make no difference whether the name or
likeness appropriated is that of a ballplayer, a Vice President or even a President." Id.
142. See Rielly, supra note 100, at 1163.
143. Id. at 1173.
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B. False Light Invasion of Privacy
The tort of false light invasion of privacy may be established "when
something factually untrue has been communicated about an individual, or
when the communication of true information carries a false implication.'
' 44
Generally, to establish this tort there are two minimal requirements to sat-
isfy. First, the falsehood must be substantially material. 145 Second, a sig-
nificant portion of the population must be exposed to the misinformation. 146
Because the latter requirement usually entails widespread publicity, 147 false
light invasion of privacy is primarily a legal restriction imposed upon the use
of speech by the mass media. 1
48
The current status of this newly established tort is still in a state of
evolution. While some courts have permitted false light actions to proceed
for innocuous or even complimentary misinformation,149 other courts have
required the falsehood to be defamatory and damaging to one's personal
reputation." 0 Another area of disagreement among the courts is whether the
false information must pertain to an intimate area of the plaintiffs private
life. ' Finally, the courts have disagreed as to whether the newsworthiness
of the plaintiff's status should influence the viability of the action."5 2
144. Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 370 (1989).
145. Id.
146. Id.; see generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a (1977) (stating that even deliberate untruths are not actionable
if minor or "unimportant").
147. See Zimmerman, supra note 144, at 371.
148. Nevertheless, "a non-media defendant who communicates misinformation about the
plaintiff to a sufficiently large group of people potentially could be held to satisfy the widespread
publicity requirement." Id. at 371 n.40.
149. See Time, 385 U.S. at 387 (finding that the plaintiff retained a cause of action even
though there was no negative connotation in the way that he was portrayed).
150. See Bernstein v. Nat'l Broad. Corp., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.C. 1955), affd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956) (holding the plaintiff to a reasonable person stan-
dard regarding whether he should have been offended). But see Dartley, supra note 56, at 207
(explaining the key difference between defamation and false light is that defamation requires proof
of harm to a plaintiff's reputation whereas false light does not).
151. Compare Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 138 (N.D.Cal. 1971) (holding that
intrusion into 'private affairs' is a necessary factor in a false light claim) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a (1977) (stating "the form of invasion of privacy covered by the
rule stated in this Section does not depend upon making public any facts concerning the private life
of the individual.... [What] is essential to the rule stated in this Section [is] that the matter pub-
lished concerning the plaintiff is not true.").
152. See Zimmerman, supra note 144, at 373.
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1. Supreme Court Treatment of False Light Claims
During the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
amined false light actions in the following cases: Time, Inc. v. Hill'53 and
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co.154 The plaintiffs in Time were a family
who had been held captive as hostages in their own home.155  The dispute
arose when Life magazine published an article concerning the play, "The
Desperate Hours," accompanied by illustrative photographs of the actors'
performances in the home where the plaintiffs had been held captive.
5 6
While the play itself was a work of fiction, the plaintiffs real-life experience
was one of the events upon which the story was based. 157 Although the
plaintiffs emerged from their real life hostage situation unharmed, 58 the play
depicted the family as subjected to both verbal and physical abuse. 5 9 The
play also portrayed the family as heroic and courageous in confronting their
captors. 160 The depiction of the plaintiffs was a positive or, at least, not a
derogatory presentation. Despite this complimentary portrayal, the Court
found in favor of the plaintiffs finding a viable false light claim when a
falsehood is either intentional or is misrepresented recklessly.16'
In Cantrell, the viability of non-derogatory false light claims was reaf-
firmed. The dispute revolved around a magazine article that discussed the
impact on the lives of a victim's family after a bridge collapsed across the
Ohio River. 62 The article referred to the emotions of the plaintiff, despite
the fact that she was not present during the interview. 63 Relying on its pre-
vious analysis in Time,'64 the Court again found liability because the article
about the plaintiff was "made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth.
' '165
Notably, in both Time and Cantrell, the newsworthiness of the respec-
tive events did not vitiate the false light claim. This finding lies in contrast
153. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
154. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
155. Time, 385 U.S. at 377.
156. Id. at 377-78.
157. The article was entitled "True Crime Inspires Tense Play: The Ordeal of a Family
Trapped by Convicts Gives Broadway a New Thriller, The Desperate Hours." Id. at 377.
158. Id. at 378.
159. Id.
160. The play portrayed the daughter as "daring," "biting the hand of a convict to make him
drop a gun," and the father as bravely trying to save his family. Id. at 377-78.
161. Time, 385 U.S. at 390.
162. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 247 (1974).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 249.
165. See id. at 250.
1998]
70 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
to the right of publicity tort which allows the newsworthiness of the subject
matter to be a complete defense.166 If the information is falsely presented
either intentionally or recklessly, the false light cause of action remains vi-
able notwithstanding the subject matter.
2. Applying False Light Tort to Contact
The common law progression of false light seems to have created a
quasi-proprietary interest in one's own image which would allow individuals
to have at least "minimal control over the manner in which [they are por-
trayed] to the world.', 167 Thus, despite President Clinton's status as a figure
in the public arena, a false light action exists if he is portrayed with either
intentional dishonesty or reckless disregard for the truth. 168 Furthermore, the
portrayal of President Clinton in Contact need not be characterized as de-
rogatory in order for the false light claim to survive.
69
Given the preceding discussion of false light, the tort suggests a very
plausible solution to combat situations like the one presented in Contact.
Extending false light to protect against the misappropriation of the Presi-
dent's image would actually serve to benefit the public, protecting them from
false and misleading images by deterring future misappropriation.1
7 0
A counter argument to a valid false light claim is that it potentially en-
croaches on First Amendment rights.' 7' President Clinton's speeches are in
the public domain, and, as Zemeckis believed, he had every right to make
use of them.1 72 In balancing these competing interests, courts would need to
weigh the prevention of injury to the general public with the protection of
free speech.in Arguably, false images "should not be unqualifiedly pro-
tected by the First Amendment, but balanced against the competing interest
of society in not having its world misrepresented by an overzealous me-
dia."' 74 Thus, First Amendment encroachment is justified by the undeniable
injury inflicted on society by untruths regarding the sitting president and,
166. Zimmerman, supra note 144, at 373-374.
167. See Dartley, supra note 56, at 209.
168. See generally id.
169. In Time, Justice Brennan made the following comment in a footnote "the published
matter need not be defamatory, on its face or otherwise, and might even be laudatory and still war-
rant recovery." Time, 385 U.S. at 385 n.9 (quoting Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543
(N.Y. 1966)).
170. False light protection not only serves individuals but is also beneficial to the public, in-
sulating them from misleading statements. See Dartley, supra note 56, at 212.
171. See id. at 214.
172. See Dawes, supra note 13.
173. See id.
174. See Dartley, supra note 56, at 215.
WHY SEEING IS NO LONGER BELIEVING
potentially, the national security of the country." 5 The Supreme Court in
Time stated that the "constitutional guarantees can tolerate sanctions against
calculated falsehood without significant impairment of their essential func-
tion."1 76 Thus, the producers of Contact would have difficulty defending a
false light claim here by that arguing that the First Amendment protects their
film.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED USES OF THE
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND IMAGE
This Comment has shown that a sitting president currently has two le-
gal causes of action against a misappropriation of his image: right of pub-
licity and false light invasion of privacy. A decision of a sitting president to
bring a civil suit against a Hollywood film producer, however, is likely to be
highly politicized. A president must consider his reputation and public im-
age at all times. Because of these political concerns, it is necessary to advo-
cate further legislative safeguards that would stymie misappropriations of a
sitting president's image and words.
A. The Use of Disclaimers
One approach would be to legislatively mandate that filmmakers who
wish to follow in Zemeckis's footsteps print a noticeable disclaimer in the
credits both preceding and following the film. Contact could have easily
displayed a short screen message explaining that President Clinton's "role"
in the film was the result of technology. With a simple message, the possi-
bility of potential misrepresentations could have been reduced. Thus, with
such a disclaimer viewers would not have thought that President Clinton had
participated in or endorsed the use of his image.
One author has suggested that a conspicuous label ought to be used for
digitally altered photographs.177 This idea could easily, and inexpensively,
be extended to moving images. Advantages of this requirement are twofold.
It addresses the national security issues as well as philosophical issues of
misrepresenting a president. More importantly, it would "bring a renewed
sense of trust and belief in the [moving] image.,
178
175. See Zimmerman, supra note 144, at 370; see generally Goodrich v. Waterbury Repub-
lican-Am., Inc. 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982) (holding that individuals have an interest in not being
misrepresented).
176. See Time, 385 U.S. at 389.
177. See Dartley, supra note 56, at 215.
178. Id.; see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-81 n.15 (1987) (upholding a require-
ment with computer altered photographs stating that "[r]esting on the fundamental constitutional
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B. Criminalizing "Dangerous" Misappropriations
While the use of a disclaimer might potentially mitigate the harm of
presidential misappropriations, its effect could be tempered if the audience
does not read it. Another alternative that would supplement the protection
afforded by a disclaimer, would be to criminalize misappropriations falling
under a legal classification of "dangerous."' 79 One possibility would be to
advocate an "Accurate Presentation Law." This kind of law would crimi-
nalize intentional or reckless misappropriations of current politicians. The
benefit of criminalizing conduct like this is that the state would be the plain-
tiff rather than the political figure, who may not bring suit due to conflicting
interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The type of technology used in films like Contact will only become
more accessible with time. Whether one sees the danger in this particular
instance is less important than seeing the potential danger of the type of
technology used in the film. 8 ' While this new technology can be used for
innocuous entertainment, it can also be used for dangerous pursuits, 1
Further, use of the President's moving image in any film implies consent.
Essentially, a fraud has been committed against the public when filmmakers
lift speech and place it in their film without receiving permission or ac-
knowledging the falsity of their actions. 11  Beyond this, and more impor-
tantly, it is the public who potentially will bear the ultimate harm from
situations that this technology can produce. In line with protecting the pub-
principle that our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and
the false .... [s]uch legislation implements rather than detracts from the prized freedoms guaran-
teed by the First Amendment" (quoting Justice Black's dissent in Viereck v. United States, 318
U.S. 236, 251 (1943))).
179. For instance, the hypothetical posed earlier-if someone portrayed President Clinton on
a comedy channel saying derogatory remarks about Boris Yeltsin and the Russians failed to see the
joke-it could be classified as "dangerous" because national security is at stake. See supra Part
IV.
180. See Dawes, supra note 13. "[T]his is a science fiction movie so I think this is a fairly
innocent context, but it does have significant implications. Where does it stop?" Id. (citing inter-
view with Professor Vivian Sobchack).
181. See supra Part IVA.
182. "[A] cynical public is going to assume the [P]resident cooperated with the makers of the
movie and profited handsomely from it." See Seeing Is No Longer Believing, supra note 44.
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lie, mandatory use of disclaimers and possibly criminalizing presidential
misappropriations are both plausible solutions.
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